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The Chancery Court of Nova Scotia: 
Jurisdiction and Procedure 1751-1855 
Jim Cruickshank* 
The Court of Chancery in Nova Scotia enjoyed a history that may 
best be described as a progression from obscurity to infamy. During its 
first half-century, the Court operated with an intermittent caseload and 
remained out of the public eye. During its final years, the Court came 
under increasing public criticism as an unnecessary and inefficient 
institution. This criticism began as early as 1829, with Haliburton's 
History of Nova Scotia.1 Joseph Howe contributed scathing editorials 
against the Chancery in the popular press2 and in 1833 Beamish 
Murdoch reviewed the Court and concluded in his Epitome of the Laws 
of Nova Scotia: 
Anyone who will deliberately read through the long, 
unmeaning, but expensive forms of bills and answers in 
Chancery, and the absurd and unnecessary processes of 
contempt, as they are called, must be blinded by a 
reverence for antiquity, ifhe does not think them unrea-
sonable. Those who are (as clients) made acquainted 
with the dilatory and unsatisfactory progress of any 
business which goes into Chancery, will feel convinced 
that there is something wrong in a system productive of 
such results. 3 
Twentieth Century historians have also focused on the shortcom-
ings of the Court, although with a more detached perspective.4 This 
paper seeks to delve behind these criticisms to ask two questions: what 
did the Court do and how did it do it? This inquiry into jurisdiction and 
procedure is undertaken with the criticisms of the Court in mind. 
Indeed, I hope that an enhanced knowledge of the Court will bring its 
shortcomings into historical focus. 
The research for this paper involved an examination of the 
original case files of the Court, along with various records kept by court 
officials. From this data base, I have attempted to draw certain 
conclusions about the Court's internal workings. This is a very narrow 
focus and I readily concede that at times the analysis will (of necessity) 
proceed in a historical vacuum. I have not attempted to compare the 
workings of this court with the Supreme Court ofN ova Scotia at the time, 
nor with contemporary courts of equity in other jurisdictions. Such a 
comparative analysis will be necessary before broad conclusions with 
respect to the Court of Chancery can be made with any certainty. 
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Therefore, the results of this paper can best be characterized as a series 
of interim hypotheses. 
The paper begins with an overview of the Court of Chancery, based 
on the work of historians to date. The results of my examination of 
original court documents follows, separated into jurisdictional and 
procedural categories. Finally, some conclusions and hypotheses will be 
drawn and ideas for future research will be suggested. 
The Court of Chancery 1751 - 1855 
The court of Chancery was established coincident with the com-
mon law courts in Nova Scotia upon the foundation of Halifax in 1749.5 
The Court sat only in Halifax, hearing some 1900 cases until its abolition 
in 1855. The Governor of the province also held the status of Chancellor 
and until the appointment of the first Master of the Rolls in 1825,6 the 
Governor actually presided over all cases. The Governors had no legal 
training, but were assisted by the Justices of the Supreme Court.7 
The Court's history can be divided into several phases. Until 1814, 
the Court heard relatively few cases. A dramatic increase in the Court's 
caseload began after 1814, which may have been the reason for the 
Master of the Roll's appointment in 1825. The criticisms of Chancery, 
noted earlier, led to modest procedural reforms in 1833.s The period 
which followed was one of relative stability for the Court, both in terms 
of volume of work and public criticism. 
Renewed calls for reform were heard beginning in the 1840s, this 
time in the form of an abolitionist movement. This movement culmi-
nated in the fusion of the Court of Chancery with the common law courts 
in 1855.9 The reform movement was not unique to Nova Scotia. The 
inherent inefficiency of a dual system of justice led to radical procedural 
reforms in England in 185210 and to the abolition of the New Brunswick 
Court of Chancery in 1854.11 
Existing Historical Studies 
The first historical account of the Chancery Court is a paper 
prepared by Charles Townshend in 1900.12 Townshend was a Justice of 
Nova Scotia's Supreme Court and his essay is a valuable outline of the 
history of the Court. His paper explores a few of the cases heard by the 
Court, but for the most part focuses on a chronological overview of the 
major events in its history. Townshend explicitly avoids delving into the 
minutiae of the Court's procedure andjurisdiction, noting: 
How [its] jurisdiction was exercised, what practice was 
adopted, and the nature of the litigation coming before 
the Court, it may safely be said, is at the present time 
unknown.13 
Townshend was the grandson of Alexander Stewart, the last 
Master of the Rolls in Nova Scotia. Stewart was the defender of the Court 
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of Chancery during the abolition debates of the 1850s and his own fate 
as Master was the subject of considerable debate prior to passage of the 
1855 fusion bill.14 As a result of this family connection, Townshend 
brings a certain bias to the later history of the Court. His view of 
Stewart's reforms is certainly optimistic15 and he openly cheers his 
grandfather's defence of the Court.16 Despite his bias with respect to the 
final phase of the Court's history, Townshend's essay remains a useful 
foundational history of the Court. 
After Townshend's essay in 1900, historians did not focus on the 
Court until a 1989 paper by Barry Cahill.17 Cahill is a Manuscripts 
Archivist at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia and his paper provides 
an excellent supplement to Townshend's work. Cahill focuses on the 
Chancery records as an archive collection, providing an in-depth exami-
nation of their sources, context, and usefulness. His work also provides 
helpful biographical background with respect to many of the principal 
figures in the Court's history. 
A third work that touches on the Court is Philip Girard's paper on 
Nineteenth Century law reform in Nova Scotia.18 Girard focuses on the 
demise of the Court in the context of law reform and thus brings its 
history into relief against a larger backdrop of contemporary socio-
political trends. 
In summary, historians to date have examined the Court in a 
variety of contexts, but never with a focus on procedure and jurisdiction. 
A substantive inquiry into the cases heard by the Court has to date not 
been attempted. As a result, this research paper should provide an 
inroad into an uncharted area of the Court's history. 
Primary Sources 
Historical studies of the Court of Chancery are facilitated by the 
existence of a fairly complete collection of all of the actual case files of the 
Court, along with a series of minute books and other memoranda.19 
Barry Cahill's article provides an exhaustive description of the collec-
tion, which will not be repeated here. My research utilized a variety of 
the documents in the collection, but principally relied on three sources. 
Each of these is considered in turn. 
The principal source for my investigation of Chancery jurisdiction 
was the Court's Chronological List of Causes.20 This list records all 
191721 Chancery cases in chronological.order. The listing indicates the 
names of the parties to each action, the nature of the suit, a:nd the date 
the action was started. This information is the basis for my analysis of 
the annual case volume of the Court and the subject matter of cases 
heard by the Court. 
The Chronological List was prepared in 1837, and later updated 
to 1855. Both the 1837 listing and update were prepared by a court 
official, John McGregor, at the request of the Master of the Rolls.22 
As historical evidence, McGregor's listing is very useful. Cahill 
concludes that the listing was originally prepared for use by the Court 
as an inventory of files and as a tool for scheduling current and semi-
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current records.23 As a contemporary document prepared for actual use 
by the Court, the List is inherently reliable, accurate, and complete. 
While McGregor's classification of cases is not always consistent, it is 
nonetheless sufficiently accurate for the purposes of my summary of the 
Court's jurisdiction. 
The case files of the Court constitute my second major research 
resource. Almost all of the 1,900 cases heard by the Court are available 
for review.24 These provide a highly reliable source for examination of 
the procedures of the Court. The completeness of many files cannot be 
assured, however, as most files do not contain a trail of documents from 
first complaint to final decree. Thus it is difficult to determine whether 
an action was simply discontinued or whether documents have gone 
missing. Two sources suggest that he former is most likely the case. 
First, a Chancery practitioner's notebook indicates that a large number 
of his cases were settled out of court.25 Second, a Court record of the 
disposition of causes from 1832 to 1835 indicates a substantial number 
of discontinued suits.26 
My third major research source is the Chancery Rules of Prac-
tice. 27 This is a bound manuscript volume in three parts. The first part 
contains the Irish "Rules & Practice of the High Court of Chancery". The 
date and source of this listing is unknown, but it would appear to have 
been used as a reference source for court officials. Both Townshend28 and 
Cahi1129 speculate that the Nova Scotia Court simply adopted these Irish 
Rules, as a complete set of domestic Nova Scotia rules was never 
created.30 As part of my procedural inquiry, I have attempted to 
determine whether the actual procedure of the Court corresponds with 
these rules. 
The second part of the Rules of Practice is a 'digest' of Irish 
chancery law, including rules with commentary, as well as case reports 
from 1640 to 1722. The third part contains the "Rules of Practice" 
promulgated in Nova Scotia by the Chancellor pursuant to the Chancery 
reform statute of 1833.31 
The Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court 
My inquiry into Chancery jurisdiction has two general branches. 
The first is an assessment of the annual caseload handled by the Court. 
The second considers the subject matter of those cases. 
The annual volume of cases is summarized in Table I. A review of 
these statistics suggests that three distinct volume phases can be 
isolated. From 1751 to 1813, the Court heard very few cases. No more 
than fourteen cases were heard in any one year and the average caseload 
for this period was only four cases per year. After 1813, the volume of 
cases rose sharply. The period from 1814 to 1828 was the busiest in the 
Court's history, averaging fourty-six cases per year, with a peak of 
eighty-four in 1822. Finally, the years from 1829 to 1855 proved to be a 
period of stability and eventual decline in case volume, averaging thirty-
seven cases per year. 
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An obvious conclusion arising from these statistics is that the 
Court was never overworked. In all but a few years, the Court's work 
could be heard at the leisurely pace ofless than one case per week. Critics 
of the Master of the Rolls, whose annual salary (£600) equalled that of 
the Chief Justice of the province, 32 were perhaps justified in questioning 
the value of this position. 
Table I 
Annual Number of Causes in Chancery 
1751 2 1786 10 1821 55 
1752 2 1787 7 1822 84 
1753 4 1788 7 1823 58 
1754 0 1789 3 1824 45 
1755 2 1790 5 1825 43 
1756 0 1791 7 1826 53 
1757 1 1792 10 1827 57 
1758 0 1793 2 1828 52 
1759 0 1794 0 1829 37 
1760 0 1795 2 1830 36 
1761 2 1796 2 1831 29 
1762 0 1797 3 1832 28 
1763 1 1798 4 1833 44 
1764 2 1799 4 1834 43 
1765 4 1800 0 1835 55 
1766 0 1801 4 1836 34 
1767 0 1802 3 1837 49 
1768 3 1803 6 1838 43 
1769 4 1804 10 1839 42 
1770 1 1805 5 1840 30 
1771 2 1806 2 1841 26 
1772 1 1807 8 1842 51 
1773 0 1808 3 1843 34 
1774 4 1809 8 1844 27 
1775 2 1810 5 1845 35 
1776 2 1811 9 1846 33 
1777 5 1812 14 1847 44 
1778 5 1813 6 1848 54 
1779 4 1814 11 1849 58 
1780 5 1815 25 1850 42 
1781 4 1816 20 1851 31 
1782 3 1817 38 1852 40 
1783 4 1818 42 1853 28 
1784 1 1819 54 1854 25 
1785 4 1820 46 1855 --11. 
Total Number of Causes 1,917 
The volume statistics also lead to the surprising conclusion that 
the volume of cases did not increase steadily over time. As the economy 
of the province grew, and particularly with the onset of Nova Scotia's 
'Golden Age' in the 1840s, one would have expected the volume of 
litigation to increase correspondingly. Townshend appears to proceed on 
this assumption when he concludes that " .. .in its latter years [the Court] 
was kept busily employed."33 To the contrary, the peak of annual case 
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volume occurred in 1822 and the final years of the Court saw a marked 
decline in case volume. Several hypotheses can be advanced to explain 
these volume patterns. The first is an economic analysis and the second 
relates to litigation psychology. 
Because some seventy-six per cent of causes heard in Chancery 
were mortgage foreclosures (see Table II), the volume of cases in any one 
year should be inversely related to the prosperity of the province. In 
difficult times, the number of foreclosures would be expected to increase. 
Analysis of the data from the Chronological List supports this assertion. 
The peak volume era of the Court, from 1814 to 1828, corresponds 
to a period of worldwide financial uncertainty. in particular, the years of 
1811, 1820, and 1826 saw economic downturns.34 Postulating a one or 
two year lag between a downturn (when debtors would stop payments) 
and the start of foreclosure actions, one would expect to find a surge in 
the number of Chancery causes in the years following these economic 
downturns. The caseload statistics support such a correlation. 1812 was 
the Court's busiest year to date, 1822 was the highest volume year ever, 
and 1827 was the second busiest year of the peak 1819 to 1828 decade. 
This explanation of case volumes can be further tested by exam-
ining the increase in the proportion of foreclosure actions in each of the 
high volume years noted above. While the historical proportion of 
mortgages was seventy-six per cent, the proportion in 1822 was eighty-
nine per cent, and in 1827 was eighty-three per cent. This suggests that 
high volume years were the result of a surge in foreclosure actions. 
However, in 1812, only fifty per cent of the actions were foreclosures. 
This contradicts my thesis, but the relatively small sample size in 1812 
may explain the deviation in that year. 
A 'litigation psychology' theory can also be advanced to explain 
certain unique caseload fluctuations. The two major reforms of the Court 
in 1833 and 1855 were both preceded by vigorous public attacks on the 
Court and by a decline in case volume. I would hypothesize that litigants 
were avoiding the Court when its shortcomings were on the public 
agenda. 
The nature of Chancery litigation was such that cases could be 
kept out of Court. Mortgagees, for example, could be more tolerant of 
indigent debtors. One case file indicates that litigants were mindful of 
the cost of a Chancery action. In Annand v. McHeffey ,35 the executors of 
a disputed will state, in their Bill for Settlement, that they had pleaded 
with the beneficiaries to settle their differences so that the expense of a 
Suit of Settlement could be avoided. Given the discretionary nature of 
Chancery litigation, it is possible that the parties moved to more 
informal dispute settlement mechanisms during the periods of public 
criticism of the Court. 
The second branch of my jurisdictional research examines the 
subject matter of cases litigated in Chancery. I have summarized the 
1,917 entries of the Chronological List by major subject categories in 




The most apparent conclusion arising from a review of Table II is 
the predominance of foreclosure actions as the major business of the 
Court. The percentage of foreclosure actions rose steadily from sixty-
eight per cent of all causes prior to 1822, to a high of eighty-three per cent 
of cases heard after 1845. The high proportion of foreclosure actions 
leads to a further conclusion that criticism of Chancery as an unneces-
sary duplication of common law litigation was overstated. Foreclosure 
actions originated in Chancery and involved no duplication of the 
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common law. The same was true for several other frequently litigated 
heads of Chancery jurisdiction in Nova Scotia. In short, these statistics 
suggest that only a handful of cases each year actually resulted in 
duplication of common law litigation. 
After foreclosures, the second largest group of cases heard in 
Chancery is injunctions, generally consisting of a Writ of Injunction to 
halt a common law proceeding.36 The frequency of injunction actions 
showed a marked decline after 1833.37 Rule 17 banned injunctions 
restraining a common law action unless applied for at least ten days 
prior to the start of the Supreme Court term in which the common law 
action was to be heard. 38 This rule appears to have been aimed at the use 
of injunctions as a stalling tactic in common law actions. The relative 
scarcity ofinjunction actions after 1833 (less than one per year) suggests 
that the rule was a success. This also adds further weight to the assertion 
that a separate Court of Chancery did not lead to a serious duplication 
of common law litigation. 
The traditional equitable remedy of specific performance was 
litigated quite rarely as an independent action, appearing only eighteen 
times during the entire history of the Court. However, specific perform-
ance may have been a collateral remedy sought in conjunction with suits 
labelled by McGregor as some other form of action. 
Actions for an account of profits saw a marked decline after 1833. 
This decline may be explained by the thirty year hiatus between 
McGregor's cataloguing sessions. McGregor may have forgotten the 
classification subtleties used in first effort, resulting in a slightly 
different classification for cases from 1837 to 1855. As actions for an 
accounting are often combined with other remedial requests, the cat-
egory is particularly susceptible to such misclassification. 
The Court's jurisdiction over probate matters was a varied one. A 
separate system of Probate Courts was operating at the time39 and the 
Chancery apparently acted as a form of probate appeal court. 40 However, 
the bulk of 'probate' work by the Chancery Court related to actions to 
settle estates which originated in Chancery. The jurisdiction might best 
be described as one of concurrent originaljurisdiction with the Probate 
Courts. For example, an 1833 will granting a life estate was proved in 
Colchester Probate Court in 1835 with respect to the life estate, but came 
before the Court of Chancery in 1840 to be settled with respect to the 
residual estate.41 
There was surprisingly little work for Chancery in the traditional 
equitable jurisdiction of trusts. Only nine actions appointing trustees 
were heard. I can only speculate as to reasons for this inactivity. In a 
relatively young colony, there may have been little accumulated wealth 
to be held in trust. However, the number of actions settling estates of 
significant value contradicts this theory.42 
Another traditional head of equity jurisdiction was the action for 
discovery. While used infrequently as an independent action (only 
thirteen such cases are noted), requests for discovery were an almost 
routine adjunct to every action in Chancery. The standard pleading 
would include the boilerplate plea: 
CHANCERY COURT 
[Your Orator is] unable to obtain the necessary proof 
required by the strict rules of evidence in [the Common 
Law] Courts and hath no relief but a Court of equity 
where matters of this kind are cognizable and where 
your Orator is entitled to a discovery of facts on the oath 
of the Defendant. 
35 
Discovery took the form of written Interrogatories, discussed below 
under the procedure of the Court. 
The Writ of Ne Exeat Regno operated as an equivalent to the 
modern Mareva Injunction. If a creditor suspected that a debtor was 
about to leave the jurisdiction, an application for the writ would be heard 
Table III 
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ex parte on the affidavit of the creditor. If the application was successful, 
the debtor would be imprisoned until the writ was answered and security 
filed with the Court.43 The writ was used quite frequently in the early 
years of the Court, but only once thereafter. I would hypothesize that as 
litigants became confident in the Court's ability to proceed with actions 
in the absence of the Defendant,44 the perceived need for the writ 
declined. 
The committal of insane persons (Inquiry into Lunacy) was a 
relatively frequent action in the early years of the Court. The decline of 
this action in later years may have resulted from some statutory 
alternative to an action in Chancery, although I am not aware of any 
specific legislation on this point. 
The broad range of the Court's jurisdiction is demonstrated in 
Table III, which lists those actions which were only infrequently liti-
gated in Chancery. No particular trends can be noted here, although it 
is perhaps surprising that the 'variety' of causes did not increase as the 
province's society became more complex. In fact, the number of 'other 
causes' heard in Chancery remains quite static over the century. 
Procedure of the Court 
The primary source for my study of the procedure of the Court is 
a sample of twenty case files.45 This source is supplemented by various 
records and memoranda prepared by Court officials. My objectives in 
reviewing the case files are to develop a sense of the Court's methodology, 
to determine the consistency of practice over time, and to assess the 
criticisms of the Court in light of its actual practice. 
While I did not focus on the actual substance of the matters 
litigated in the twenty cases sampled, a synopsis of the cases is presented 
inAppendixA. The most obvious pattern that emerges from the synopsis 
is that large sums of money were usually at stake in Chancery litigation. 
In those cases in my sample which involved a monetary sum, the average 
amount at issue was over £700. 
One interesting aspect of my procedural inquiry is the source of 
procedural norms for the Court. As discussed earlier,46 historians have 
speculated that Ireland's Chancery Rules of Practice were adopted as 
the basis for Nova Scotia procedure. This speculation is buttressed by the 
fact that the province's first two Chief Justices were the Irish bar.47 
However, there is no explicit historical evidence to prove that the Irish 
Rules were in fact adopted. Therefore, in reviewing the case files I have 
attempted to correlate actual court procedure with the Irish Rules48 as 
a means of verifying their use in Nova Scotia. 
My review of procedure can be grouped into two areas: pleadings 
and court practice. 
Pleadings 
Actions in Chancery were initiated by filing a Bill of Complaint. 
The Bill describes the complaint, the remedy sought, and the factual 
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background to the case. The Answer of the Defendant is usually a mere 
formal denial of the Bill, although it sometimes presents an alternative 
view of the facts. The basic form of these pleadings is familiar to a modern 
lawyer, with a recital of facts followed by a claim for relief. The style of 
cause is typically noted in a 'backer' to the pleadings, a practice which 
continues to this day in Nova Scotia. 
The language and form of pleadings changed little in the 105 year 
history of the court. This consistency suggests some norm of pleadings 
was adhered to. Standard phraseology recurs throughout the years and 
between different draftsmen. For example, each Bill concludes with the 
plea that the Complainant " ... hath no relief but a Court of Equity where 
matters of this kind are cognizable and where your Orator is entitled 
to ... "49 
The structure and classification of pleadings is completely consist-
ent with the Irish Rules.50 One aspect of the Irish Rules which did not 
survive in Nova Scotia was the terminology for the 'complainant'. The 
Irish Rules explicitly state that the "persons complaining are normally 
called plaintiffs."51 However, Chancery practice in Nova Scotia consist-
ently avoids this term, referring only to 'complainants' and in the 
pleadings themselves to 'Your Orator'. 
A troublesome rigidity in Chancery pleadings was the practice of 
stating accusations in the Bill as alleged facts and then repeating the 
allegation in the form of interrogatories to be asked on Discovery. This 
practice led to Bills which routinely ran to a length of forty or more large 
manuscript pages.52 The practice may have been considered necessary 
by cautious practitioners to ensure that all necessary interrogatories 
were allowed at Discovery. However, I was unable to find any Irish Rule 
which restricted interrogatories to those questions explicitly stated in 
the Bill. 
The Court attempted a reform of Pleadings in its 1833 Rules. Rule 
9 clarified that one general interrogatory is sufficient to compel an 
answer to every material allegation in the Bill.53 Some practitioners 
complied with the Rule, as in the following pleading: 
[Plea that the] Defendants may upon their several and 
respective corporal oaths true full and perfect answers 
muster to all and singular the premises as if the same 
were herein again repeated and they [were] thereto 
particularly interrogated ... 54 
However, many pleadings continued to detail individual interrogatories, 
although the particular questions are generally restricted to matters not 
already alleged in the BilI.55 
Practitioners' compliance with the new rule is understandable, as 
the Court refused after 1833 to tax costs for unnecessarily lengthy 
pleadings: 
... useless repetitions and prolixity in the Pleadings to be 
avoided in all cases, and no allowance to be made for 
them in the taxation of costs [Rule 13].56 
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It is noteworthy that the Irish Rules contain a similar prohibition 
against 'useless repetition',57 although the enforcement mechanism of 
refusing to tax costs is not mentioned. 
The form of Defendants' Answers was as consistent over time as 
the Bills of Complaint. The Answers universally began with the stand-
ard phrase: 
The Defendants now and at all times hereafter saving 
and reserving to themselves all and all manner ofbenefit 
of advantage and exception to the manifold errors, 
imperfection, uncertainties and insufficiencies in the 
said Bill of Complaint contained for answer thereunto or 
unto or so much thereof as these Defendants are advised 
it is adjudged material or necessary for them to make 
answer unto answering say that ... 58 
This form may have been a convenient response to the Irish Rules, which 
require the Defendant to answer each charge in the Bill or risk conceding 
the charge. 59 
Early pleadings generally allege fraud and conspiracy, 60 although 
no such prerequisite can be found in the Irish Rules. The allegation was 
likely included so that unnamed parties could be Discovered after the 
close of pleadings. As well, an allegation of fraud may have been 
perceived as a prerequisite to equitable jurisdiction. This anomaly in 
pleading was addressed in the 1833 Rules, which ordered "No averment 
of combinations or pretence shall be made in any Bill, except in cases 
where an actual combination took place."61 
Court Practice 
The Court's involvement in a case begins with the issue of a 
subpoena to compel the appearance of the Defendant. The Irish Rules 
with respect to subpoenas62 appear to have been adopted in Nova Scotia. 
It is interesting that the Irish Rules grant extra time for response to a 
subpoena for Defendants living more than twenty miles outside Dublin63 
and an identical twenty mile zone was established in Nova Scotia in the 
1833 reform.64 
Virtually every court file contains a subpoena, which generally 
required an appearance to answer the Bill within fourteen days. Many 
of the subpoenas appear to have been ignored with impunity. Files which 
I examined often indicate a long delay from service to the appearance 
date of the Defendant and there was no apparent penalty imposed by the 
Court.65 
The 1833 Rules attempted to address the subpoena problem by 
setting clear deadlines for a response to service.66 However, Defendants 
continued to delay. In an 1840 Action, an August 24 subpoena was 
responded to by a Solicitor's Appearance the following January 30, and 
Answers were not filed until Contempt of Court proceedings were 
started in September of 1841. 67Similar delays are noted in other cases. 68 
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While formality of pleadings was maintained, there was appar-
ently some room for flexibility. In one case, a mortgagor succeeded in 
delaying foreclosure proceedings by a direct appeal to the Chancellor. 
Master Cogswell responded on the Chancellor's behalf: 
Notwithstanding the irregularity and impropriety of 
addressing papers to His Excellency in his Capacity as 
Chancellor relative to the merits of a suit placed in a 
course of judicial investigation in the Court of Chancery, 
His Excellency has been induced in consideration of your 
alleged distress and inability to fee Counsel at the time 
to suspend proceedings until you could have a reason-
able time for the purpose.69 
Cogswell continues on to advise the Defendant of the risk of defending 
the suit too strenuously, as the "expense of litigation will fall upon 
you."70 
The procedure for Interrogatories in Nova Scotia appears to have 
followed the Irish Rules. 71 Independent Commissioners were appointed 
to administer the written questions and record the answer of the 
witness. The Irish Rules appear to forbid general Interrogatories,72 
however, Nova Scotia did not follow this practice. An 1814 case required 
fourteen Interrogatories, the last in the following form: 
Do you know of any other matter or Thing which can 
tend to the Benefit of or advantage of the Complaint in 
the above cause, if [so] you [are to] relate the same 
especially and particularly as if the same were herein set 
down, and you thereto [were] particularly interrogated. 73 
The Chancery reform legislation of 1833 allowed for examination 
of witnesses viva voce "when and as the said Court shall think proper" ,74 
but did not ban the use of Interrogatories. None of the post-1833 files 
which I examined included written Interrogatories, although each Bill 
continued the practice of requesting them. Therefore the extent of oral 
examination of witnesses after 1833 is unclear. 
The final ruling of the court in each cause takes the form of a 
decree. These are often lengthy75 because a thorough recital of the 
allegations of the parties is included. Unfortunately the decrees do not 
provide any reasoning to support the judgment of the Court. 
A sense of the nature of Chancery hearings is obtained from a 
review of the various minute books kept by the court's officials. The 
records note in outline form the matters heard at each sitting of the 
Court. A review of the 184 7 Minute Book76 indicates that the court sat 
on only thirty-five days during that year. The hearings were often 
scheduled for Tuesdays, on an as needed basis. Sittings were held in 
every month of the year except March, with the autumn months being 
the busiest. On a typical hearing day motions might be heard on as many 
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as six cases. I would speculate that the sittings might have resembled a 
modern day Supreme Court Chambers session. 
The Court's practice in a number of specific areas indicates a clear 
correlation to the Irish Rules. Each of these areas is examined in turn. 
The Irish Rules required the Answer of the Defendant to be 
provided upon oath. 77 This was the general practice in all Nova Scotia 
cases, but in Storey v. Wallace the Answer was provided without oath. 
The irregularity of this occurrence is evidenced by the Complainant's 
certification that he would accept the Answer without Oath.78 
When a Complainant seeks relief because a note evidencing a debt 
has been lost, Irish Rule 30 required an affidavit swearing to the truth 
of the circumstances surrounding the loss of the note. In McElhinney v. 
Dickson,79 such an affidavit is attached to the Bill of Complaint, the only 
case of the twenty which I reviewed in which such an affidavit was filed. 
Further evidence of compliance with the Irish Rules is the use of 
Appearance Notices by Counsel to seek leave of the Court for additional 
time to prepare the Defendant's Answer, as required by Irish Rule 50.80 
Final evidence of a correlation is found in Wood v. Sparrow 81, where a 
Writ of Ne Exeat Regno was issued following procedure exactly in 
conformity with Irish Rule 73. 
Much has been made of the prominence of the lawyers who 
appeared before Chancery. Townshend observed that many were promi-
nent politicians or future Judges. His conclusion: 
The well-known reputation of these lawyers is a suffi-
cient guarantee that, especially in later times, the mat-
ters litigated in the Court of Chancery must have been 
tried with learning and accurate knowledge of equity 
jurisprudence. 82 
A less benevolent conclusion is that a small clique of Halifax lawyers had 
monopolized the Chancery practice. Contemporary criticism on exactly 
this point is documented in Professor Girard's paper.83 
The monopoly of Chancery practice manifested itself in a distinc-
tion made in Chancery between 'solicitors' and 'counsel'. While Nova 
Scotia never had a 'split bar' in which solicitors would refer court work 
to barristers, a specialized practice approaching such a split bar appears 
to have developed in Chancery. Pleadings were typically signed by both 
a solicitor and Counsel84 and the records of a Chancery practitioner note 
a referring solicitor for each case. 85 This formally recognized specialist 
bar does not appear to have been emphasized by previous historians. 
A recurring criticism of the Court was the cost oflitigation.86 Of 
my sample of twenty cases, only three included the taxed solicitor's costs. 
Of these three (all foreclosures), the average solicitor's taxed fee was 
£ 70, representing about ten per cent of the value of the property being 
foreclosed.87 Legal fees of this magnitude appear high by today's stand-
ards and the basic foreclosure and sale process in Chancery appears 
similar to that in use in Nova Scotia today. In addition to lawyer's fees, 
parties were required to pay court fees. These were typically about£ 6, 
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with approximately£ 2 allocated to each of the Chancellor, Master, and 
Registrar. 88 
Another criticism of the Court was the delay which it imposed on 
litigation. However, case file data does not support this criticism. Eight 
of the twenty case files I examined proceeded to final decree, and the 
average time from Bill of Complaint to Decree was just over twelve 
months.89 Another sample of cases can be drawn from the Return of 
Causes prepared by the Registrar of the Court for 1832,90 which indi-
cates that twenty-four of twenty-nine causes were brought to a conclu-
sion, at an average duration of seven months. The Registrar noted an 
explanation beside most causes delayed for more than a year. Typical 
explanations were that the Court's costs had not been paid or that the 
matter remained outstanding in the hands of the litigants. Excluding 
those causes with such an explanation, the average duration of cases 
drops to five and one-half months. 
The statistics on case duration do not indicate an unduly pro-
tracted litigation system. In light of the time allowed for Defendants to 
respond to service (thirty days within Halifax and sixty days otherwise), 
a five and one-half month case duration does not justify the criticism 
levelled at the Court. 
Certain actions by Chancery litigants might today be perceived as 
delaying tactics, but these were actually intrinsic to the Court's proce-
dure. Townshend's comment on one case illustrates this misconception: 
The defendants appear to have invoked all sorts of 
devices to delay the complainant and to impede the 
progress of the cause. Demurrer was filed, motions 
made, examiners appointed, evidence taken under in-
terrogatories, references made to the Master, reports 
thereon, exceptions thereto; but finally the [Plaintiffi 
prevailed .... 91 
What Townshend viewed as delaying tactics were, of course, typical 
proceedings in almost any Chancery action. 
Conclusion 
Because the focus of research for this paper was quite narrow, it 
is appropriate that my conclusions be temperate. In general, the data 
surveyed has produced a reliable picture of Chancery practice and 
jurisdiction, however, this picture will only be brought into proper focus 
after additional comparative research is completed. In the same sense, 
the historical significance of my findings will only be measurable after 
this additional research has been completed. 
With respect to the criticisms of the Court, I would hypothesize 
that these were justified with respect to the costs of litigation and the 
inherent inefficiency of an institution that simply did not have a large 
volume of work. However, I would suggest that the criticisms as to delay 
and duplication were overstated. The nature of cases litigated in Chan-
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cery indicate that duplication was not a widespread problem, and the 
time required to complete most cases suggests that the Court was 
relatively effective in managing its modest caseload. Again, these con-
clusions need to be tested in a comparative analysis with other tribunals, 
particularly the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. 
In the area of practice and procedure, I would conclude that the 
Irish Rules of Practice were the basis for Nova Scotian practice and were 
followed consistently throughout the history of the Court. This conclu-
sion is based on the empirical evidence obtained by comparison of actual 
procedure to the rules themselves. This evidence is persuasive, but not 
completely conclusive. While a strong correlation with the Irish Rules 
exists, it is unclear whether other potential sources for rules would also 
correlate strongly with Nova Scotian practice. However, the bulk of 
historical evidence supports the Ireland connection. 
With respect to the jurisdiction of the Court, the predominance of 
actions that did not stem from a common law suit supports the hypoth-
esis that criticism of this duplication of common law proceedings may 
have been overstated. In addition, the predominance of foreclosure 
actions and the scarcity of actions under other traditional equitable 
heads of jurisdiction suggests that the Court's development was cur-
tailed at a stage of relative immaturity. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
As discussed above, the research reported in this paper should 
serve as a foundation for a number of divergent inquiries, each of which 
could test and explore my hypotheses. Some particular areas ofresearch 
are noted here for future reference. 
1. A comparative analysis of Nova Scotian Chancery procedure 
with the procedure of equity courts in other jurisdictions (and with Nova 
Scotia's Supreme Court) will place my research into context. Particular 
areas to focus on would include the duration and expense of litigation. 
2. A comparison of the practice and pleadings of the Nova Scotia 
Chancery to those in Ireland after 1751 would be an interesting com-
parative analysis. An interesting question is the extent to which Ire-
land's practice developed in new directions after its export to Nova 
Scotia. 
3. A comparison of the substantive decisions of Chancery to those 
of other jurisdictions may well be impossible. Unfortunately, most 
Chancery files give no information about the legal reasoning that 
supports a Decree. Any analysis in this area would have to proceed on a 
deductive approach, surveying a large number of cases on one topic, and 
imputing a rule oflaw from the case results. Given the limited number 
of cases under most heads of jurisdiction, there may be insufficient data 
available to complete this kind of analysis in Nova Scotia. 
4. Analysis of the legislative debates leading to fusion may well be 
enhanced by the findings in this paper. The arguments advanced by both 
sides may be more critically assessed in light of the empirical data 
provided by my research. 
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5. A comparison of the Chancery jurisdiction before and after 
fusion could be undertaken. Professor Girard notes that there are 
unanswered questions surrounding the post-fusion period92 and these 
questions could be explored in the context of a procedural comparison to 
the pre-fusion era. 
6. Further studies of the correlation between foreclosure actions 
and the provincial economy would serve as a test of my hypothesis on this 
point and could shed light on the utility of foreclosures as a debt 
collection mechanism. 
7. The background and training of Chancery lawyers could be 
investigated. While the volume of litigation could not have supported 
full-time equity practitioners, the degree of specialization could be 
assessed. As well, the ties between generations of Chancery lawyers 
could be examined to determine how equity practices evolved. 
8. Analysis of litigants would provide an interesting profile of 
economic and commercial relations in the province. One hypothesis 
could query the extent to which litigation is restricted to the commercial 
classes of Halifax and the rural propertied class. 
9. The procedure and practice of the Masters in Chancery was not 
a focus of my research, but could be profitably reviewed. 
Appendix A 
Synopsis of Cases Examined (Chronological Order) 
Turnbull v. Smith (1782) PANS 57. Action to compel payment of a debt. 
Paymaster of Halifax Garrison advances £1, 100 in lieu of payment owing 
by a Halifax banker. Banker dies and his heirs refuse to honour the debt 
owing to the Garrison. Solicitors: Attorney General Gibbons, Solicitor 
General Uniacke. 
Wood v. Sparrow (1782) PANS 58. Application for Ne Exeat Regno. 
Halifax merchant agreed to advance £200 to an artillery regiment at a 
discount rate of two per cent. Market rates increased to ten per cent, and 
the merchant planned to leave Nova Scotia without advancing the loan. 
The merchant was imprisoned pursuant to the Writ for one month, and 
released after filing security with the Court. Solicitors: Mr. Fitzgerald, 
R.J. Uniacke. 
Roach v. Converse ( 1810) PANS 186. Foreclosure oflands in Cumber land 
county mortgaged for £800. Solicitors: Lewis Wilkins, Crofton Uniacke. 
Foreman v. Campbell (1810) PANS 188. Foreclosure of mortgaged lands 
in Guysborough. The debt secured by the mortgage was for £3,000. 
Solicitor: Thomas Ritchie. 
Wollenhauht v. Webster et al. (1811) PANS 188. Injunction to stop a 
common law debt action, and for an account. A Lunenburg merchant 
purchased goods from a London merchant for £700, giving a note in 
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payment to the London merchant's agent, and guaranteeing the pay-
ment by the London merchant to third party suppliers in England. The 
London merchant went bankrupt, defaulting on his payment to third 
party suppliers, and the Lunenburg merchant made good on his guaran-
tee. The Halifax agent now seeks to collect the original note on behalf of 
the bankrupt. Solicitor: Crofton Uniacke. 
Delesdernier v. Stanner (1812) PANS 197. Action for Dower. The Com-
plainant's husband mortgaged a Windsor property which was foreclosed 
in 1773 despite the Complainant's Dower interest. The Complainant 
now seeks compensation for her Dow er interest. The deed evidencing her 
husband's ownerchip of the property was lost during the American 
attack on Fort Cumberland in 1776. Solicitor: R.J. Uniacke. 
Creighton v. Schner (1814) PANS 212. Bill to perpetuate testimony. A 
witness to a disputed Lunenburg will was near death. A commission was 
appointed to take interrogatories and file the responses with the Court. 
Solicitors: T.B. Robie, J.A. Stewart. 
McElhinney v. Dickson (1824) PANS 643. Action seeking relief from the 
common law and discovery. A Londonderry farmer loaned money to the 
Defendant's father, an Onslow shipbuilder. The Defendant was a mem-
ber of the provincial House of Assembly. The Complainant lost the note 
evidencing the debt of £400, and the Defendant denies existence of the 
debt, which is now not provable at common law. Solicitors: W. Johnson, 
William Hill. 
Chipman et al. v. Beckwith (1825) PANS 644. Foreclosure of mortgaged 
lands in Cornwallis. The Defendant had borrowed £485 from the Plain-
tiffs, who were Cornwallis merchants. Solicitor: W. Johnson. 
The King v. Leaver (1825) PANS 1897. Action of Scire Faci to revoke 
Letters Patent. A Crown grant of land in Sydney was conditional upon 
the land being used for a school. As the school did not transpire, the 
province sought revocation of the grant. Solicitors: Attorneys General 
Uniacke (1825) and Archibald (1832). 
Re Eleanor Francis (1836) PANS 1902. Petition for a new commisioner 
to act as guardian for Eleanor Francis, who has been an 'idiot' since 1824. 
Donaldson v. Davis (1837) PANS 1179. Bill for Directions from the 
Court. The creditor has a lien on the Pictou house of an absconded debtor, 
in the amount of £500, and seeks to eject the current occupants of the 
house. Solicitors: Thomas Akins, Henry Blackader. 
Harvie v. Chandler et al. (1837) PANS 1206. Action to settle the estate 
of a Halifax landowner. The will had left a life estate to the deceased's 
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wife and the remainder to seven children. Two issues were decided by the 
Court. (1) One son predeceased his mother, leaving a wife and six 
children. Their interest in the remainder is contested, as the estate had 
not vested at the time of his death. The Court ruled in favour of the son's 
heirs. (2) A daughter and her husband had assigned her interest in the 
remainder to a trust for their children to evade an assignment made by 
the husband to a creditor under the Insolvent Debtors Act. The Court 
ruled that the daughter's interest in the remainder was a legal interest 
which vested in her husband upon their marriage, and that the assign-
ment to the trust was a fraudulent conveyance. The Court upheld the 
trust corpus, but ruled that the assignee under the I nsoluent Debtors Act 
had a first claim on the income of the trust. Solicitors: James F. Gray, 
Charles Young. 
Annand v. McHeffey (1840) PANS 1331. Settlement of the estate of a 
Shubenacadie farmer. This was the only case examined in which parties 
settled out of court andilled a Settlement Agreement with the Court. 
Solicitor: George Young. Counsel: William Young, James Stewart, Charles 
Twinning. 
Bernardi et al. v. Heckman (1841) PANS 1348. Action against the 
administrator of an Estate for an accounting. Complainants are the 
heirs in Italy of a Lunenburg merchant. The administrator was a 
creditor of the deceased. The case includes two competing wills, one 
drawn under Italian civil law, and the other in Nova Scotia. Solicitor: 
William Young. Counsel: George Young, James Gray. 
Storey v. Wallace ( 1842) PANS 1367. Bil ofRevivor to continue an action, 
which had abated on the death of the Complainant. Soliciotrs: James 
Gray (also of Counsel), Charles Twinning. 
Re Joanna Herbert et al. (1846) PANS 1530. Petition for guardianship. 
A widow in Dartmouth seeks a guardian for her children so that their 
interest in the family home (received on intestacy of their father) can be 
mortgaged to pay the debts of the father's estate. 
Uniacke v. Eustace ( 1846) PANS 1531. Foreclosure of a Halifax property 
for a debt of £170. The Complainant is James B. Uniacke, who is acting 
as his own solicitor, but with other counsel (J.W. Ritchie, James Gray). 
Chisholm v. Johnston (1847) PANS 1547. Injunction to stop a common 
law debt action. Complainant purchased land in Sydney from the 
Defendnt, and issued a £320 note in consideration therefore. Defendant 
did not have good title to the property, yet still sought to collect on the 
note at common law. Solicitor: Mr. Sawers. 
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Goldsmith v. Slocumb (1849) PANS 1640. Foreclosure ofland in Wilmot. 
The underlying debt of £100 was owed to a mortgagee in Annapolis. 
Solicitor: George Milledge. Counsel: J.W. Ritchie. 
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